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NO MISREPRESENTATION NEEDED:  
EXCEPTING DISCHARGE FOR ACTUAL FRAUD 
UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 523 WITHOUT 
MISREPRESENTATION 
Morgan Green* 
 
Imagine buying a game from a seller and promising to repay him at a 
later date.  However, instead of repayment, you decide to give the game to 
your friend, who in turn allows you to use it.  Then your friend declares 
bankruptcy to discharge the price of the game from his debts, thus allowing 
you both to use it without paying.  This repayment runaround is the issue 
that the First and Fifth Circuits were asked to decide in two recent cases.  
Specifically, the question was whether a debt incurred by “actual fraud” 
may be discharged by the recipient of the transfer without a 
misrepresentation of repayment. 
The Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) serves as a vehicle to help those who 
have encountered unsuccessful ventures to discharge their obligations and 
start anew.  The Code does not, however, grant a debtor the absolute right 
of discharge, as many exceptions exist to prevent fraudulent behavior.  One 
of these exceptions is 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), which excepts from 
discharge any debt obtained by “false pretenses, a false representation, or 
actual fraud.”  Circuit courts have differed in their application of the 
statute, thus creating a circuit split concerning whether a debtor must make 
a misrepresentation in order to constitute “actual fraud.”  This Note argues 
that “actual fraud” is meant to encompass a fraudulent transferee’s intent 
to defraud and does not require a misrepresentation concerning the 
prospect of repayment.  By focusing on the transferee’s intent, these debts 
would be nondischargeable, thus requiring repayment to the seller. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most believe that people are entitled to a second chance—that one 
mistake should not permanently affect someone and be held over him or her 
forever.  In many ways, the concept of a second chance was the focal point 
of the current Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”), which grants a debtor a less 
encumbered fresh start after bankruptcy.  The Code generally allows 
debtors to discharge their debts and start anew without a large sum hanging 
over their head.1  However, there are many exceptions in the Code to ensure 
that only honest and unfortunate debtors reap these benefits.2  One example 
is 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), which prevents the discharge of a debt 
“obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.”3 
This provision has caused confusion among the appellate circuits 
regarding whether a misrepresentation by the debtor is required to 
constitute “actual fraud” within the meaning of the statute.4  A circuit split 
 
 1. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2012). 
 2. See S. REP. NO. 95-1106, at 1 (1978). 
 3. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). 
 4. Compare Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) (No. 15-145) (holding that a misrepresentation is 
required to constitute “actual fraud” under the statute), with Lawson v. Sauer Inc. (In re 
Lawson), 791 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 2015 WL 4537882 (U.S. July 
24, 2015) (No. 15-113) (ruling that a misrepresentation is not required to constitute “actual 
fraud” under the statute). 
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arose from different holdings in two similar cases, both involving the 
transfer of an already incurred debt to a third party to avoid repayment to 
the creditor, and neither of which involved a misrepresentation concerning 
repayment of the debt.5  The contrasting opinions highlight two different 
theories regarding the scope of the statute with respect to the requirement 
(or lack thereof) of a debtor’s misrepresentation, thus creating a circuit split 
on the appropriate statutory interpretation. 
The Fifth Circuit, which requires a debtor’s misrepresentation to 
constitute actual fraud, allowed a debt to be discharged when the debtor 
transferred funds to corporate entities that he controlled in order to avoid 
repayment to the creditor because he did not misrepresent the prospect of 
repayment.6  To determine that Congress intended to require a 
misrepresentation as a necessary element of actual fraud, the court relied on 
a Supreme Court opinion addressing a different provision of § 523,7 and its 
interpretation of the definition of “actual fraud” as it was known in 1978—
the year the Code was revised.8  Additionally, the Fifth Circuit noted that 
there is a separate provision in the Code that governs fraudulent transfers 
meant to hinder or defraud a creditor that better fit the facts of the case.9 
By contrast, the First Circuit, in a case involving a similar set of facts, 
determined that such a runaround of the creditor—even without a 
misrepresentation—should not be entitled to the benefits of the Code.10  In 
doing so, the court relied on canons of construction, legislative history, and 
its interpretation of the meaning of “actual fraud” to determine that a 
misrepresentation is not required under the statute.  In expressly disagreeing 
with the Fifth Circuit,11 the First Circuit held that the statute is meant to 
recognize the difference between constructive and actual fraud, which 
concerns the intent of the transferee to defraud and is not intended to 
require a misrepresentation from the debtor.12  Both of the losing parties in 
these cases filed petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court to resolve the 
split regarding this issue of statutory interpretation.13  On November 6, 
2015, the Supreme Court granted the petition in Husky International 
 
 5. See generally Ritz, 787 F.3d 312; Lawson, 791 F.3d 214. 
 6. See Ritz, 787 F.3d at 317–18. 
 7. See id. at 317 (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 63 (1995) (holding that a 
misrepresentation under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) requires a showing of justifiable 
reliance)).  In Field, the Court noted that the terms in the statute are terms of art that take on 
the common law meaning associated with them when the provision was enacted. Field, 516 
U.S. at 69.  This applies to “actual fraud” as well as “misrepresentation” under § 523. Id. 
 8. See Ritz, 787 F.3d at 320. 
 9. See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (2012)) (“The court shall grant the debtor a 
discharge, unless . . . the debtor with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor . . . has 
transferred . . . property of the debtor.”).  This provision affects the transferee of the already-
incurred debt, but it does not allow a creditor to reach the recipient of the transfer. Id. 
 10. See Lawson, 791 F.3d at 220–21. 
 11. Id. at 216. 
 12. See id. at 220 (citing McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
 13. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 2015 
WL 4593754 (U.S. July 30, 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) (No. 15-145); 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lawson v. Sauer Inc. (In re Lawson), 2015 WL 4537882 
(U.S. July 24, 2015) (No. 15-113). 
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Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz14 and heard the case in March of 2016.15  It chose 
not to act on the petition from Lawson v. Sauer Inc.16 filed in the same 
year.17 
This Note focuses on the inconsistencies in the application of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) in requiring a misrepresentation to constitute actual fraud, 
specifically as it relates to the circuit split that arose from Ritz and Lawson.  
Part I discusses the case law construing § 523, including a precursor to the 
split, as well as the circuit courts’ decisions in Ritz and Lawson.  Part II 
discusses bankruptcy law and explains how the current Code took its form.  
Specifically, it describes the history of bankruptcy in America as well as 
discharge—particularly in the context of 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 and 727—and 
explains its purpose in the Code.  Finally, Part III argues that § 523 does not 
require a misrepresentation to constitute “actual fraud.”  A reading of the 
statute that requires a misrepresentation (1)  is contrary to legislative history 
of the provision and prior case law construing the statute; (2)  is contrary to 
the plain meaning of the text of the statute; (3)  is contrary to the purpose of 
the Code; (4)  is inapplicable with respect to modern transactions (e.g., 
credit card transactions); and (5)  fails to adequately balance the rights 
between creditors and debtors.  For these reasons, it is clear that § 523 does 
not require a misrepresentation to constitute “actual fraud,” and a contrary 
reading of the statute is severely limiting in instances such as Ritz or 
Lawson. 
I.  NOT ON THE SAME PAGE:  CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON 
WHETHER MISREPRESENTATION IS REQUIRED UNDER § 523 
Courts have struggled to interpret § 523, particularly concerning whether 
a misrepresentation is required to constitute “actual fraud.”18  While a 
difference in opinions from seemingly analogous cases during the summer 
of 2015 highlighted this issue and formally created the circuit split,19 the 
divergence began with an earlier case from the Seventh Circuit in 2000.20 
 
 14. 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) (No. 15-145). 
 15. SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket 
files/15-145.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) (indicating the dates that the petition was 
granted and the case argued) [https://perma.cc/QS9X-8EWU]. 
 16. 791 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 2015 WL 4537882 (U.S. July 
24, 2015) (No. 15-113). 
 17. SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/ 
15-113.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) (indicating, as of publication, that the Supreme Court 
has not granted or denied the petition for certiorari) [https://perma.cc/9TT2-G2BX]. 
 18. Compare Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 445 (requiring a formal misrepresentation by a debtor in order to 
constitute “actual fraud” under the statute), with Lawson, 791 F.3d 214 (rejecting the 
misrepresentation requirement used by the Fifth Circuit), and McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 
F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that misrepresentation is not required under the statute by 
relying upon canons of construction and legislative history). 
 19. See Ritz, 787 F.3d 312; Lawson, 791 F.3d 214. 
 20. See McClellan, 217 F.3d 890. 
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A.  No Misrepresentation Necessary:  The Seventh and 
First Circuits Require Only Fraudulent Intent 
Before the First and Fifth Circuits disagreed, the Seventh Circuit decided 
a similar case involving “actual fraud,” which laid the groundwork for the 
current split.21  The specific issue in McClellan v. Cantrell,22 like that of 
Ritz and Lawson, was whether misrepresentation is a required element of 
“actual fraud” under § 523.23 
In the case, the creditor, McClellan, sold ice-making machinery to the 
declarant’s brother who ultimately defaulted on the security interest.24  
Shortly after McClellan filed suit against the brother, the brother sold the 
machinery to his sister, Cantrell, for ten dollars, and she quickly sold it for 
$160,000.25  Two years later, Cantrell filed for bankruptcy seeking to 
discharge the original debt.  McClellan objected—seeking to recover the 
value of the machinery—claiming Cantrell was the recipient of a fraudulent 
transfer of her brother’s debt under § 523.26  The issue of contention 
quickly became whether a misrepresentation is required to constitute 
“actual fraud” under the statute.27  It was clear that Cantrell, who 
maintained no contact with the creditor, had not made any 
misrepresentations to him regarding repayment for the machinery.28 
The district court evaluated the case under the framework of Field v. 
Mans,29 an earlier Supreme Court case concerning the level of reliance 
needed from a creditor in regard to a debtor’s misrepresentation under the 
misrepresentation prong of § 523.30  Using Field as a guide, the court ruled 
that in order for a debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A), a 
debtor must make a misrepresentation that the creditor reasonably relied 
on.31  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s opinion 
and ruled that Field was not controlling, as the current facts were 
distinguishable from the prior case.32  The court went on to note that many 
cases assume that fraud and misrepresentation are intertwined, but most of 
those cases involve situations that solely concern misrepresentation and not 
 
 21. See id. 
 22. 217 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 23. See id. 
 24. Id. at 892. 
 25. Id.  The machinery originally was sold to Cantrell’s brother for $200,000. Id.  The 
$160,000 that Cantrell received disappeared, and she would not tell the court where it went. 
Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 892–93. 
 28. See id. 
 29. 516 U.S. 69 (1995). 
 30. See McClellan v. Cantrell, No. 99 CV 5601, 1999 WL 966097, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
13, 1999), rev’d, 217 F.3d 890 (citing Field, 516 U.S. at 69). 
 31. See id. (citing Field, 516 U.S. at 69).  This is the standard that the Court created in 
Field to evaluate a misrepresentation under the statute. Field, 516 U.S. at 72. 
 32. McClellan, 217 F.3d at 892.  The Seventh Circuit noted that Field involved a 
misrepresentation between the parties and was litigated under a different term of the statute. 
Id.  McClellan was tried under the “actual fraud” provision of the statute, and therefore Field 
does not directly control. Id. 
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the “actual fraud” provision of the statute.33  Using canons of construction, 
such as the rule against surplusage,34 the Seventh Circuit determined that by 
including both the terms “false representation” and “actual fraud” in the 
statute, Congress clearly intended for “actual fraud” to encompass more 
than just situations of affirmative deceit.35  Furthermore, considering that 
the purpose of the Code was to provide relief to honest debtors, the court 
ruled that this sort of runaround involving a debtor being able to transfer 
valuable property to another for inadequate consideration in order to 
circumvent a creditor “is as blatant an abuse of the Bankruptcy Code as we 
can imagine” and turns the Code into “an engine for fraud.”36 
When considering § 523(a)(2)(A), the court determined that the provision 
recognizes the difference between “actual fraud” and “constructive fraud” 
and serves to except from discharge the “actual fraud” variety.37  Compared 
to constructive fraud, which exists regardless of the transferee’s intent to 
deceive and includes situations where honest debtors were unfortunate in 
their business ventures, “actual fraud” is a term meant to recognize the 
transferee’s intent and complicity to join the fraudulent enterprise.38  The 
court determined that this distinction excepts from discharge a debt that was 
transferred to hinder a creditor because of the transferee’s intent to defraud 
the creditor, regardless of whether a misrepresentation was made.39 
McClellan argued (and ultimately proved) that Cantrell knowingly 
participated in her brother’s scheme to avoid repayment and intended to 
defraud McClellan,40 making her acquisition of the machinery one obtained 
by fraud.41  For those reasons, the court determined that § 523(a)(2)(A) was 
satisfied without a misrepresentation and ruled that the debt was excepted 
from discharge.42 
The First Circuit adjudicated a similar set of facts in Lawson and also 
determined that a misrepresentation was not a required element of actual 
 
 33. Id. at 892–93. 
 34. The rule against surplusage is a canon of construction that dictates that each term 
used in a particular statute must be given a unique meaning from the other terms used; 
otherwise, it would be redundant. Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text 
in This Class?”  The Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 619, 630 (2005) (citing WILLIAM ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 267 (2000)). 
 35. McClellan, 217 F.3d at 893. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 894 (citing Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877)). 
 38. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 129–30 (1977).  For further discussion on the 
difference between “actual fraud” and “constructive fraud,” see infra Part III.B. 
 39. See McClellan, 217 F.3d at 894–95. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id.  A debt is not something you obtain; it is something incurred as a consequence of 
receiving something of value from another person (a creditor). Id.  Here, Cantrell received 
the machinery from her brother, not the creditor, which strains the statutory language of the 
term “obtained by” in the context of a debt. Id. at 895.  However, the court determined that 
the fraud in this scenario occurred when the brother transferred the property in order to avoid 
his obligations with the creditor. Id.  That makes the property obtained by Cantrell property 
obtained by fraud and within reach of § 523. Id. 
 42. Id. at 894. 
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fraud, as the only necessary condition is the debtor’s intent to defraud.43  
This decision created a circuit split, as it expressly disagreed with a Fifth 
Circuit opinion from earlier that year.44 
In Lawson, Sauer Inc. had won a judgment against James Lawson from 
prior business dealings that were fraudulent.45  To prevent Sauer from 
collecting, Lawson transferred funds to a shell entity owned by his 
daughter, the declarant in the bankruptcy petition.46  Sauer quickly noticed 
the transfer and sued Ms. Lawson to recover the funds, leading her to file 
for Chapter 13 bankruptcy to discharge the debt.  Sauer objected to the 
discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A), alleging that Lawson obtained the debt 
from her father via actual fraud.47 
In its analysis of “actual fraud,” the First Circuit agreed with the Seventh 
Circuit in ruling that the canons of construction require a broader reading of 
the statute, and the term “actual fraud” must include more than just a 
misrepresentation; otherwise the text would be redundant.48  Furthermore, 
the court looked to section 871 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to 
determine the definition of “actual fraud” when the statute was written.49  
This section defines fraud as the act of intentionally depriving another of 
their legally protected property interest.50  The court interpreted this 
definition, as well as the holding in McClellan, to determine that the 
primary element of “actual fraud” is the transferee’s intent to deceive the 
creditor and can occur without a misrepresentation.51  The court believed 
that this reading most closely followed the intent of Congress, the history of 
bankruptcy practice, and the tradition of “affording relief only to an ‘honest 
but unfortunate debtor.’”52 
B.  Of Course Misrepresentation Is Required: 
 The Fifth Circuit Will Not Except Debts Under 
§ 523 Without Misrepresentation 
A couple of months before the First Circuit decided Lawson, the Fifth 
Circuit adjudicated a similar case in Ritz and reached a different result than 
 
 43. Lawson v. Sauer Inc. (In re Lawson), 791 F.3d 214, 220 (1st Cir. 2015), petition for 
cert. filed, 2015 WL 4537882 (U.S. July 24, 2015) (No. 15-113). 
 44. See id. at 216 n.1 (citing Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 787 F.3d 312 
(5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) (No. 15-145)). 
 45. Id. at 216. 
 46. Id. at 216–17. 
 47. Id. at 217. 
 48. Id. at 220 (citing McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
 49. Id. at 219.  Section 871 defines the perpetration of fraud as the act of “[o]ne who 
intentionally deprives another of his legally protected property interest or causes injury to the 
interest is subject to liability to the other if his conduct is generally culpable and [when the 
perpetrator’s conduct is] not justifiable under the circumstances.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 871 (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see also infra Part II.  This section of the 
Restatement is different from the one used in Ritz. Ritz, 787 F.3d at 318–19 (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537). 
 50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871 . 
 51. See Lawson, 791 F.3d at 222. 
 52. Id. (quoting Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 217–18 (1998)). 
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the Seventh and First Circuits, by requiring a misrepresentation from the 
debtor for a debt to be excepted from discharge for “actual fraud.”53 
In Ritz, Chrysalis, a company in which Mr. Ritz was the controlling 
director, acquired electronic components from Husky International 
Electronics, Inc. for $163,999.38 to be paid at a later date, thus creating a 
debt to Husky.54  Over the next two years, Ritz quietly transferred $1.16 
million—including the incurred debt—to seven different corporate entities 
that he controlled before Husky filed suit to hold Ritz personally liable for 
the debt.55  Subsequent to the suit, Ritz filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy to 
discharge the debt, which led to Husky objecting under § 523(a)(2)(A), 
alleging that the funds were obtained via actual fraud.56 
In ruling that a misrepresentation is required to constitute “actual fraud,” 
the Fifth Circuit criticized the Seventh Circuit’s holding in McClellan, 
stating that it created tension with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Field, 
which it believed was controlling, even though it concerned the 
misrepresentation provision of § 523.57  The court largely followed the 
same method of analysis as the Supreme Court in Field, by looking at 
definitions of “actual fraud” as it was understood in 1978, to attribute 
meaning to the term.58  The Fifth Circuit even used the same section of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts as the Supreme Court in Field to attribute 
meaning to “actual fraud.”59  This section concerns justifiable reliance of a 
misrepresentation60 (the issue of contention in Field), not actual fraud, 
which was the issue of contention in Ritz. 
The court went on to suggest that the addition of the term “actual fraud” 
to the statute was not meant to create a new category for dischargeability, 
but to codify the limited scope of fraud reflected in case law at the time of 
enactment.61  The court noted that this limited scope was meant to 
recognize actual fraud and exclude the constructive category, but it did not 
 
 53. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 787 F.3d 312, 321 (2015) cert. granted, 
136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) (No. 15-145). 
 54. Id. at 314. 
 55. Id.  Husky attempted to pierce the corporate veil of Chrysalis to hold Ritz personally 
liable for the debt. Id. at 315.  Under Texas law, the director of a company must engage in 
“actual fraud” in order to pierce the veil. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (West 
2015).  The court did not address this issue as it found that “actual fraud” did not occur 
under the Bankruptcy Code, making the veil-piercing question irrelevant. Ritz, 787 F.3d at 
316. 
 56. Ritz, 787 F.3d at 316.  Husky alleged that Ritz perpetrated an “actual fraud” by 
transferring the funds to other entities with the intention of avoiding payment. Id. 
 57. Id. at 317 (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995)).  In contrast, Ritz was petitioned 
under the “actual fraud” provision of § 523. Id. 
 58. Id. at 317–18 (citing Field, 516 U.S. at 70). 
 59. Id. 318–19 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (AM. LAW INST. 1979); 
W. PAGE KEETON & WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 108, at 794 (4th ed. 1971)).  The Supreme Court used section 537 of the Restatement 
(“Misrepresentation”) to adjudicate Field. See Field, 516 U.S. at 70.  The Fifth Circuit 
acknowledged that this section deals with misrepresentation but was not appropriate here 
because it was bound by Field, and Husky had not pointed to any other provision of the 
Restatement that was more applicable. Ritz, 787 F.3d at 318 n.9. 
 60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537. 
 61. Ritz, 787 F.3d at 320. 
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evaluate Ritz’s actions in relation to this definition.62  The court simply 
noted that a distinction existed before discussing other issues.63 
Additionally, the court argued that § 523 does not encompass Ritz’s 
transfers (although as both the transferor and transferee, he clearly acted 
with intent to defraud), as a separate provision of the Code was meant to 
handle these sort of fraudulent transfers.64  The court questioned why 
Husky did not pursue recovery under § 727 in its opposition to Ritz’s 
discharge, but it may have overlooked a part of the statute.65  First, § 727 is 
only applicable to Chapter 7 bankruptcies,66 which was satisfied here, as 
Ritz filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.67  However, § 727 only excepts 
fraudulent discharge with intent to hinder or delay a creditor if the act was 
done within one year prior to filing the petition for bankruptcy.68  Here, 
Ritz transferred funds into his other companies two to three years before he 
filed for bankruptcy,69 making his activity outside of the scope of § 727 and 
preventing Husky from recovery under the statute.  Husky would have had 
to monitor Ritz and Chrysalis’s activities closely for several years and acted 
earlier in order to recover under § 727. 
The decision to allow the debt to be discharged is peculiar from an 
outside perspective, as it seems to allow the use of the Code to perpetuate 
fraudulent activity.  Husky pointed out that the case seemed strange for 
those involved as well, including the U.S. Bankruptcy judge that originally 
heard the case, who urged Husky to appeal the decision and remarked sua 
sponte: 
I think [Ritz] drained Chrysalis of a lot of money. . . .  I think he was 
trying to drain that company. . . .  I don’t think I’ve ever said this on the 
record, but I’m going to say it now.  I hope you do appeal me.  I hope an 
Appellate Court tells me I’m wrong, because I don’t believe Mr. Ritz.  I 
think he was trying to drain that company.70 
The differences in the seemingly analogous cases of Ritz and Lawson 
highlight the confusion that currently exists among the appellate courts in 
the interpretation of the “actual fraud” provision of § 523(a)(2)(A).71  Both 
 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id.  The court was referring to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (2012), which excepts 
discharge where “the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor . . . has 
transferred . . . property of the debtor” within one year of filing the bankruptcy petition.  This 
provision focuses on the transferor of the debt (the original debtor), not the recipient of the 
fraudulent transfer. Id. 
 65. Id. at 320–21. 
 66. See 11 U.S.C. § 727; infra Part III. 
 67. See Ritz, 787 F.3d at 315. 
 68. See 3 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL ¶ 727.02 (4th ed. 2012). 
 69. Ritz, 787 F.3d at 314–15.  The transfers occurred between November 2006 and May 
2007, and Ritz did not file for bankruptcy until December 2009. Id. 
 70. Brief for Petitioner at 10–11, id. (No. 14-20526).  The bankruptcy court ruled that, 
despite the seemingly inequitable result, the debt was dischargeable as it was under the 
impression that absent an express misrepresentation, a debt is not excepted from discharge 
under § 523(a)(2)(A). In re Ritz, 459 B.R. 623, 635–36 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011). 
 71. Compare Ritz, 787 F.3d 312 (holding that a misrepresentation is required to 
constitute “actual fraud” under the statute), with Lawson v. Sauer Inc. (In re Lawson), 791 
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cases involved the transfer of a debt incurred through normal circumstances 
to a party who acquiesced to hinder the collection of the debt, without 
misrepresenting the prospect of repayment.72  The losing party in each case 
filed a petition for certiorari in hopes of the Supreme Court resolving this 
statutory interpretation issue.73  On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court 
granted the petition in Ritz,74 and it chose not to act on the petition from 
Lawson.75 
II.  HOW DID WE GET HERE?:  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 
This part discusses the history of bankruptcy law in America, starting 
with its English origins, and explains how the Code became what it is 
today.  Additionally, it discusses the concept of discharge (including § 523 
and § 727), explains how it evolved throughout history, and examines its 
purpose in the Code.  The concepts behind bankruptcy and discharge are 
integral to understanding the arguments in Ritz and Lawson. 
A.  Bankruptcy:  As American As Apple Pie 
Bankruptcy has been an important part of U.S. culture since the nation’s 
conception.  The Founding Fathers thought the uniform application of 
bankruptcy was so important that they gave the legislature the power to 
prescribe federal rules and regulations for it in the Constitution.76  The 
history of bankruptcy in the United States (like most of the country’s legal 
system), however, begins long before the nation was formed and dates back 
to sixteenth-century England, as traditional English bankruptcy laws were 
considered when creating American bankruptcy law.77  This section briefly 
discusses the origins of bankruptcy law in English culture, before 
explaining its incorporation into American law and its evolution through the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.  The Bankruptcy Reform Act is where 
 
F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 2015 WL 4537882 (U.S. July 24, 2015) (No. 
15-113) (holding that a misrepresentation is not a requirement for “actual fraud” under the 
statute). 
 72. See Ritz, 787 F.3d at 312; Lawson, 791 F.3d at 214. 
 73. See Ritz, 787 F.3d at 312; Lawson, 791 F.3d at 214. 
 74. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 787 F.3d 312, cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) 
(No. 15-145). 
 75. SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/ 
15-113.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) (indicating, as of publication, that the Supreme Court 
has not granted or denied the petition for certiorari) [https://perma.cc/9TT2-G2BX]. 
 76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“Congress shall have Power 
To . . . establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.”).  James Madison’s The Federalist No. 42 exemplifies the importance of bankruptcy 
to the Founding Fathers, which explained that bankruptcy is so connected with the regulation 
of commerce that the legislature must reserve the power to regulate it as well. THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).  Madison’s view was ultimately adopted in Article I, 
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 77. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). 
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most of the current Code was created—including § 523, which has stayed 
largely the same through the present.78 
In sixteenth-century England, debtors were treated as quasi-criminals in a 
system that heavily favored collectors.79  The first bankruptcy laws were so 
collector friendly that only a creditor could commence a bankruptcy 
proceeding, and a debtor had no ability to discharge a debt.80  This system 
allowed a creditor to file a bankruptcy proceeding, freeze the debtor’s 
assets, sell the debtor’s assets to recover proceeds pro rata, and continue to 
pursue the debtor individually if the full debt was not satisfied.81 
Eventually, in 1732, England passed the bankruptcy statute that 
influenced the first unified American Bankruptcy Law in 1800.82  This 
English law incorporated concepts of voluntary discharge, capital 
punishment for unethical behavior, and involuntary proceedings against 
debtors initiated by creditors.83  At its core, the bankruptcy law was (and to 
an extent still is) debt collection law that mandates how to treat those whose 
debts surpass their assets and how to determine which creditors are entitled 
to the limited assets that remain.84 
Although Congress was empowered by the Constitution to enact 
“uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies,”85 it did not enact 
permanent bankruptcy legislation until the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.86  The 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was more debtor friendly than any prior temporary 
legislation, as it abolished many restrictions on discharge, limited the 
grounds of denial of discharge, and allowed a debtor’s voluntary 
discharge.87  Discharge in the context of the Code means that an 
individual’s future earnings, inheritances, and gifts are free from the 
liabilities incurred in the past.88  This allows an individual to start anew 
without creditors seizing their assets. 
The 1898 version of the Code was a precursor to § 523 and contained 
similar provisions.  Specifically, it prohibited discharge from debts that “are 
judgments in actions for frauds, or obtaining property by false pretenses or 
false representations, or for willful and malicious injuries to the person or 
property of another.”89  The statute stayed in practice largely untouched 
 
 78. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523, 92 Stat. 2549. 
 79. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 7–8 (1995). 
 80. Id. at 8 (citing 13 Eliz. 1, c. 7 (1570) (Eng.)). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 12 (citing Bankruptcy Act of 1800 ch. 19; 5 Geo. 2, c. 30 (1732) (Eng.)). 
 83. Id. at 10–12. 
 84. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 3–4 (1986). 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 86. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978); see also Tabb, supra 
note 79, at 13–14.  Before 1898, bankruptcy was governed either by temporary legislation 
that only remained active for several years or by state legislation. Tabb, supra note 79, at 
13–14. 
 87. See Tabb, supra note 79, at 2425. 
 88. See JACKSON, supra note 84, at 227. 
 89. Bankruptcy Act of 1889, ch. 541, § 17(a)(2), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
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until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,90 which revamped the entire 
Code and made it more or less what is today.91 
B.  Discharge:  How Do Debts Disappear? 
One of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Reform Act (and the enactment of 
discharge, in general) was to “give the debtor a less encumbered ‘fresh 
start’ after bankruptcy.”92  For this reason, discharge has been compared to 
a form of limited liability that exists for corporations, but instead for 
individuals.93  While the Bankruptcy Reform Act was written to follow this 
clearly stated policy, it is important to note that there is no absolute right to 
discharge, as there are many exceptions in the Code, including those in 
§ 523 and § 727.94  The purpose of discharge is to provide relief for 
unfortunate debtors, and the exceptions exist to ensure that financial aid is 
only available to those who truly deserve it.95  However, discharge also 
works to create a balance of rights between creditors and debtors, which is 
significantly related to risk allocation of lending.96  The balancing of rights 
in this context greatly affects business through the monitoring of 
individuals’ credit decisions and the availability of funds that creditors are 
willing to offer, as a creditor will only advance funds if there is a high 
prospect of repayment.97  This makes the balance vital, as a small shift can 
throw off the whole system and greatly affect the economy. 
There are several statutes that govern the discharge of debts, but for the 
purpose of this Note, only § 523 and § 727 are relevant.98  Section 727 is 
the general discharge statute, and it states that discharge should be 
construed liberally to allow the discharge of debts unless it is clearly limited 
by the text of the Code or by federal statute.99  One exception to discharge 
provided by the Code is § 523, which prohibits discharge mostly for illicit 
behavior in order to conform to the purpose of the Code:  to allow relief for 
unfortunate debtors.100  Specifically, § 523(a)(2)(A) excepts discharge of a 
 
 90. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
 91. A few minor changes were made to the Code since 1978, including 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(2)(A), which was amended in part ten times between 1979 and 2016. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523 (Supp. V 2012).  However, the text of § 523(a)(2)(A) has remained largely the same 
throughout these amendments.  For the purposes of this Note, the subtle differences in these 
amendments are not of importance. 
 92. S. REP. NO. 95-1106, at 1 (1978); see also JACKSON, supra note 84, at 225 
(“[D]ischarge is viewed as granting the debtor a financial fresh start.”). 
 93. See JACKSON, supra note 84, at 22930 (comparing the concept of limited liability for 
large corporations to discharge for individual debtors). 
 94. See Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Determining Congressional Intent Regarding 
Dischargeability of Imputed Fraud Debts in Bankruptcy, 54 MERCER L. REV. 987, 988 
(2003). 
 95. See S. REP. NO. 95-1106, at 1. 
 96. See JACKSON, supra note 84, at 249. 
 97. See id.  A creditor will not extend funds to individuals if there is a substantial risk of 
nonpayment, including discharge through bankruptcy. Id.; see also infra Part III. 
 98. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A), 727 (2012). 
 99. See 3 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra note 68, ¶ 727.01[1]. 
 100. See S. REP. NO. 95-1106, at 1. 
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debt “for money, property, [or] services . . . obtained by false pretenses, a 
false representation, or actual fraud.”101 
If a creditor or adverse party objects to a debtor’s bankruptcy filing, they 
are given the right to file an objection, which prevents a court from 
automatically granting discharge and forces it to consider the bankruptcy 
petition on its merits.102  Once creditors object to discharge, they obtain the 
burden to prove that the discharge is improper and must state the grounds 
for exception through an applicable exception in the Code.103  It is through 
this procedure that courts have struggled to interpret § 523, particularly as 
to whether a misrepresentation must occur in order to constitute “actual 
fraud.”104 
An alternative to § 523 for a creditor to except a bankrupt’s discharge is 
§ 727.  Some believe that § 727 is the appropriate solution to the acts of 
those in Ritz and Lawson.105  As previously stated, § 727 discusses 
discharge in general, but it also provides specific instances in which 
discharge is not appropriate and is only applicable to Chapter 7 
bankruptcies.106  Chapter 7 bankruptcy deals with the liquidation of 
debtors’ estates for all “persons” under the law.107  Relevant to the cases 
that caused the circuit split, one of the exceptions included in § 727 
prevents discharge by a debtor who transferred the property of a creditor 
within one year of filing a petition for bankruptcy “with intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud a creditor.”108  Once this is proven, a creditor who wishes 
to have their property returned can attempt to sue the original debtor, wait 
for him to declare bankruptcy and object under § 727, or turn to § 548 of 
the Code to attempt to void the transfer.109  Section 548 states that 
[t]he trustee may avoid any transfer . . . of an interest of the debtor in 
property, or any obligation . . . incurred by the debtor, that was made or 
incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing petition, if the 
debtor voluntarily or involuntarily—(A) made such transfer or incurred 
 
 101. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).  The phrase “willful and malicious injuries to the person 
or property of another” was changed to the term “actual fraud” in the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See Bankruptcy Act of 1889, ch. 541, § 17(a)(2), 30 Stat. 
544 (repealed 1978). 
 102. See 11 U.S.C. § 4004(c)(1)(B). 
 103. Id. § 4005. 
 104. Compare Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) (No. 15-145) (holding that a misrepresentation is 
required to constitute “actual fraud” under the statute), with Lawson v. Sauer Inc. (In re 
Lawson), 791 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 2015 WL 4537882 (U.S. July 
24, 2015) (No. 15-113) (holding that a misrepresentation is not a requirement to constitute 
“actual fraud” under the statute). 
 105. See Ritz, 787 F.3d at 320–21. 
 106. 11 U.S.C. § 727. 
 107. 1 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra note 68, ¶ 109.09[3] (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§ 109(b)).  “Persons” under Chapter 7 includes individuals, corporations, and partnerships, 
but excludes governmental units. Id. ¶ 109.03[1]. 
 108. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(2). 
 109. See id. § 548. 
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such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to 
which the debtor was or became . . . indebted.110 
However, it is important to note that there are several limitations to § 548 
and § 727 that highlight why § 523 is necessary for situations like Ritz and 
Lawson.  First, § 548 only allows a transaction to be voided by those who 
are acting on behalf of an estate as a trustee and will not permit a creditor to 
void a transfer if they are acting in an individual capacity and for their own 
benefit.111  This is a broad exception that would prevent the creditors in 
both Ritz and Lawson from voiding the transfers.  Second, § 727 only 
applies to fraudulent transactions related to Chapter 7 bankruptcies and only 
those that occur within one year of the petition for bankruptcy.112  That 
makes § 727 inapplicable to cases such as Lawson, which was petitioned 
under Chapter 13,113 as well as Ritz, where the fraudulent transfers occurred 
more than one year prior to the petition for bankruptcy.114  Additionally, 
§ 727 poses some difficulty in creditors obtaining a return on their property, 
as it only affects the illegal transferor, not the transferee that receives the 
funds in question.115  In a case like Ritz or Lawson (if we assume that they 
are both eligible for the exception under § 727), the creditor cannot object 
to the recipient’s discharge under § 727, as the statute does not touch the 
recipient of such an illegal transfer, but rather only affects the transferor 
who no longer possesses the funds.116  Put simply, the creditor would not be 
able to take direct action against the party that possesses the goods or funds 
in question and would have to initiate a separate suit against that third party 
or hope that the original debtor is solvent to recover against in a direct suit 
against them. 
Without an additional denial of discharge, creditors would either find 
themselves prohibited from recovering their property or forced into a 
situation where a third party (likely unfamiliar to the creditor) is added to 
the fray, requiring multiple suits.  This would cause confusion, unnecessary 
transaction costs, and increased litigation costs for creditors, in turn making 
lending less attractive and more complicated.  Such an inequitable reading 
of the statute would go against the purpose of the Code, which, in addition 
to granting relief to honest debtors, is supposed to recognize the rights of 
creditors.117  This highlights the purpose and the importance of § 523 
reaching the original debtor. 
 
 110. Id. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
 111. See 3 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra note 68, ¶ 548.02 [4]. 
 112. See id. ¶ 727.02. 
 113. See Lawson v. Sauer Inc. (In re Lawson), 791 F.3d 214, 217 (1st Cir. 2015), petition 
for cert. filed, 2015 WL 4537882 (U.S. July 24, 2015) (No. 15-113). 
 114. See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 787 F.3d 312, 314–15 (5th Cir. 
2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) (No. 15-145).  Ritz transferred the funds to his 
other entities two to three years before filing for bankruptcy. Id. 
 115. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Tabb, supra note 79, at 10.  It is important to note that increased rights to 
debtors, and discharge in general, are relatively new concepts in bankruptcy law, which 
originally only recognized the rights of creditors. Id.; see also infra Part III. 
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III.  MISREPRESENT THIS:  
§ 523 DOES NOT REQUIRE MISREPRESENTATION 
The difference in opinions between the Fifth and First Circuits identifies 
a major interpretive discrepancy in § 523.118 
The focal point of the circuit courts’ disagreement is statutory 
interpretation and the congressional intent behind § 523.  As discussed, 
§ 523 specifically excepts from discharge a debt “for money, property, [or] 
services . . . obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual 
fraud.”119  Essentially, the disagreement in the circuits stems from the 
question:  What does “actual fraud” mean under the statute, and what are its 
required elements?  Statutory interpretation and its methods are much-
discussed topics that foster strong opinions and little consensus.120  For 
purposes of this Note, both the legislative history and the textual analysis 
have merit and are helpful in deciphering § 523. 
By analyzing the statute, it is clear that contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s 
belief, a reading of § 523 that requires misrepresentation to constitute 
“actual fraud” (1)  is contrary to the legislative history of the statute and 
prior case law construing the statute; (2)  is contrary to the plain meaning of 
the text of the statute; (3)  is contrary to the purpose of the Code; (4)  is 
inapplicable with respect to modern transactions (i.e., credit card 
transactions);  and (5) fails to balance the rights between creditors and 
debtors.  For these reasons, it is clear that § 523 does not require a 
misrepresentation to except from discharge a debt obtained by “actual 
fraud.” 
A.  Legislative History and Prior Case Law 
By looking at the legislative history of § 523, as well as prior cases that 
have analyzed the statute, it is possible to attribute meaning to a term that 
has proven problematic to define.  It is clear from both the legislative 
history, as well as a prior Supreme Court case that analyzed § 523,121 that 
“actual fraud” is meant to encompass scenarios where the transferee 
intended to defraud a creditor, regardless of the presence of a 
misrepresentation.  Thus, the transferees’ intent to defraud is paramount to 
determine if they committed “actual fraud.” 
 
 118. See supra Part I. 
 119. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(2)(A). 
 120. For more information on the theories of statutory interpretation, see ROBERT A. 
KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014), which advocates that a thorough inquiry into 
legislative history is necessary to accurately interpret a statute, and ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012), which 
criticizes the use of legislative history in understanding a statute, while advocating for the 
use of methods that focus solely on the words used in the statute itself.  For further 
discussion on the current state of judicial statutory interpretation, see Abbe R. Gluck, What 
30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 607 (2014). 
 121. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995). 
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1.  Legislative History:  
Attributing Meaning Based on Congressional Intent 
The legislative history of § 523 lends support to the idea that by using the 
term “actual fraud,” Congress sought to codify a transferor’s fraudulent 
intent and was not concerned with a misrepresentation.122  The legislative 
history behind § 523 is admittedly scarce and leaves few clues as to what 
Congress intended by the term “actual fraud.”123  This is one of the reasons 
why the Supreme Court coined this provision of the statute as a “term[] of 
art” that takes on common law meaning.124  However, while there might not 
be much in the legislative history that illustrates legislative intent,125 what 
does exist provides vital insight.  According to Congress, when it crafted 
the statute, “actual fraud” was added as a separate ground for exception to 
discharge,126 and it was made clear that “subparagraph (A) is intended to 
codify current case law e.g. Neal v. Clark, which interprets ‘fraud’ to mean 
actual or positive fraud rather than fraud implied in law.”127  This 
distinction inherently highlights Congress’s intent to penalize behavior that 
falls under the “actual fraud” variety and is consistent with the holding in 
Neal v. Clark,128 while ignoring behavior that is merely “constructive 
fraud” or “fraud implied in law.”129 
Neal, which was codified in § 523(a)(2)(A) and provided Congress with 
definitions for “actual fraud” and “implied fraud,” concerned the 
interpretation of bankruptcy law in 1877, before a permanent federal statute 
was created.130  The lawsuit focused on a will’s executor who sold bonds to 
Neal at a discount after Neal claimed that the estate was in debt to him for 
funds that had been advanced.131  Neal subsequently sold the bonds to a 
third party.132  The same year, a suit was initiated against the executor to 
obtain a settlement of the distribution of the estate.133  As a result, the 
executor was forced to issue a new bond with Clark as a surety.134  About 
seven years after the executor had become insolvent, Clark sued Neal 
seeking the value of the bonds, alleging that the executor committed a 
 
 122. See S. REP. NO. 95-989 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787; H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-595 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963. 
 123. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787; H.R. REP. NO. 95-
595, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963. 
 124. See Field, 516 U.S. at 70. 
 125. See Radawan, supra note 94, at 998. 
 126. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 78, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5864. 
 127. 124 CONG. REC. H11,089, at 32,399 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Hon. 
Don Edwards) (citation omitted). 
 128. 95 U.S. 704 (1877). 
 129. For further discussion on the differences between “actual fraud” and “constructive 
fraud,” see John C. McCoid II, Constructively Fraudulent Conveyances:  Transfers for 
Inadequate Consideration, 62 TEX. L. REV. 639 (1983). 
 130. See Neal, 95 U.S. 704; see also Bankruptcy Act of 1889, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 
(1898) (repealed 1978); see also supra Part II. 
 131. Neal, 95 U.S. at 704. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 705. 
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devastavit of the estate and that Neal was a liable participant.135  Neal 
subsequently filed for bankruptcy seeking to discharge the bonds he 
received, to which Clark objected, citing an exception to discharge under a 
statute similar to § 523, which dealt with fraud or embezzlement.136 
In its opinion, the Court discussed the meaning of fraud in the statute and 
determined that it referred to positive fraud (actual fraud), not fraud implied 
by the law (constructive fraud).137  The Court noted that positive fraud in 
the context of bankruptcy is closely related to debts created by 
embezzlement and requires an element of “moral turpitude” or intentional 
wrongdoing.138  Conversely, it determined that implied fraud occurs when 
the participant is an honest citizen who did not act with bad faith or 
immorality, but was unfortunate in his ventures.139  The Court believed that 
this interpretation was aligned with the intention of Congress in enacting 
bankruptcy law to aid honest citizens “from the burden of hopeless 
insolvency.”140  Under this framework, the Court determined that Neal did 
not act with the intent to defraud Clark, thus allowing him to utilize the 
Code to discharge his debt.141 
By specifically requiring “actual fraud” in order to except discharge, as 
opposed to implied fraud or fraud in general, Congress did not intend to 
require an explicit misrepresentation, but was instead concerned with the 
transferor’s intent and the transferee’s complicity in the enterprise.  
Congress had the opportunity to enact a statute with the term “fraud,” but 
instead chose to use the term “actual fraud.”  By using “actual fraud” in 
§ 523, Congress acknowledged a clear distinction between the terms and 
decided that actions that fit the definition of “actual fraud” were meant to be 
excepted from discharge, but not those that only fit the definition of “fraud” 
or “implied fraud.”142 
The distinction provides that a fraud obtained with moral turpitude or bad 
faith (actual fraud) shall not be dischargeable, but one obtained without 
such intent can be freely discharged.143  This reading implies that 
wrongdoing or intent to defraud is more important than misrepresentation.  
Surely, one can intend to defraud a creditor without making an explicit 
misrepresentation.  This shows that Congress did not intend to require a 
misrepresentation to constitute actual fraud, but meant to codify the 
traditional common law term concerning the transferee’s intent. 
 
 135. Id.  Devastavit is a Latin term meaning “[t]he mismanagement of a decedent’s estate 
by an administrator.” Devastavit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 136. See Neal, 95 U.S. at 705 (citing Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 
(repealed 1878)).  This section of the 1867 Code provides that “no debt created by the fraud 
or embezzlement of the bankrupt . . . shall be discharged under this act.” Bankruptcy Act of 
1867, ch. 176.  This statute was the predecessor to what is now § 523. 
 137. Neal, 95 U.S. at 709. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 129–30 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963. 
 143. Id. 
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2.  Case Law:  Attributing Meaning Based on the 
Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence 
In Field v. Mans, the Supreme Court analyzed part of § 523 in a manner 
that provides insight into the current issue.144  While this case is not entirely 
analogous to the cases that split the circuits in 2015, it concerned a separate 
term of the statute145 that prompted differing levels of reliance among the 
circuit courts in evaluating “actual fraud.”146  While the circuits relied on 
Field differently, they agreed that the method that the Supreme Court used 
in reaching its decision was proper.147 
In the case, Field sold real estate to a corporation owned by Mans, who 
paid with cash and a promissory note in the form of a second mortgage.148  
The mortgage deed contained a clause requiring Field’s consent to any 
conveyance of the land during the term of the mortgage.149  If Mans 
conveyed the property without permission, the entire unpaid balance of the 
note would become due immediately.150  Four months after the deal was 
agreed upon, Mans conveyed the property to his newly formed partnership 
before asking Field’s consent, thus triggering the clause in the note making 
the unpaid balance due immediately.151  Mans asked Field the day after the 
conveyance was made to waive the “due on sale” clause, but Field did not 
consent.152  Mans never informed Field of the transfer and did not discuss 
the topic further.153  Three years later, due to plummeting real estate prices, 
Mans petitioned for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 11 of the Code.154  
Field then learned of the conveyance and objected to Mans’s discharge, 
alleging that $150,000 had become due upon the conveyance and, by 
breaching the contract, Mans had obtained it by fraud.155 
 
 144. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995). 
 145. See id. at 441–42 (referring to “misrepresentation” under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A) 
(2012)). 
 146. Compare Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 787 F.3d 312, 317 (5th Cir. 
2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) (No. 15-145) (considering Field to be controlling 
on the issue of “actual fraud”), with Lawson v. Sauer Inc. (In re Lawson), 791 F.3d 214, 
218–19 (1st Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 2015 WL 4537882 (U.S. July 24, 2015) (No. 
15-113) (rejecting the level of reliance that the Fifth Circuit placed on Field in interpreting 
“actual fraud”). 
 147. See Ritz, 787 F.3d at 318; Lawson, 791 F.3d. at 219. 
 148. Field, 516 U.S. at 61. 
 149. Id. at 61–62 
 150. Id. at 62. 
 151. Id.  The conveyance was meant to be a contribution to Mans’s land development 
organization. Id. 
 152. Id.  Mans never asked for Field’s consent to convey the property, but only asked for 
a waiver of his rights after the property was conveyed. Id.  The waiver request never 
informed Field that the property already had been conveyed, but led to a negotiation between 
Field and Mans concerning an appropriate price to pay for the waiver, which was ultimately 
never agreed upon. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.  Chapter 11 of the Code in this context refers to a small business debtor seeking 
relief for a debt not exceeding $2,000,000. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D)(A) (2012). 
 155. Field, 516 U.S. at 62 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)).  The petition initially sought 
to except the discharge under the “actual fraud” provision of § 523, but the court believed 
that the “misrepresentation” provision was more appropriate. Id. at 62–63. 
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Unlike Ritz and Lawson, which analyzed the statute as it related to 
“actual fraud,” the Court in Field analyzed the complaint under the 
misrepresentation provision and granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in 
the circuits regarding the level of reliance a creditor must demonstrate on 
the misrepresentation to except discharge.156 
The Court looked at the operative terms of the statute (“false pretenses,” 
“false representation,” and “actual fraud”) to determine that these words 
were terms of art that have a basis in common law, and “[i]t is . . . well 
established that ‘where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled 
meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer . . . that Congress 
means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.’”157  To 
determine the meaning of the terms of the statute, the Court looked to 
definitions dated from when the language was added in 1978.158  
Ultimately, through analysis of the sources, the Court determined that the 
statute required only a reasonable level of reliance in ruling that Mans’s 
debt should not be discharged.159  While the holding in this case is not of 
the utmost importance to the subsequent cases that deal with “actual fraud,” 
courts have used this method of analysis to attribute meaning to “actual 
fraud,” but have differed in their execution of it, as well as the weight given 
to the holding in Field, thus resulting in a circuit split.160  To reach a 
uniform application of the statute, courts must agree on the appropriate 
sources of interpretation, as well as a determination that Field is not directly 
controlling on cases of “actual fraud.” 
B.  Text:  What Did the Terms Mean 
When the Statute Was Enacted? 
Another method of interpreting statutes is analyzing the plain meaning of 
the words that Congress chose to codify in the text when it was written.161  
The Supreme Court used this method to decipher § 523 in Field, albeit 
regarding a different term of the statute.162  By looking at the appropriate 
 
 156. Id. at 63 n.4 (citing In re Mayer, 51 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Allison, 960 F.2d 
481 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Burgess, 955 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Ophaug, 827 F.2d 340 
(8th Cir. 1987); In re Mullet, 817 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
 157. Id. (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)). 
 158. Id. at 70.  The inquiry focused on the Restatement (Second) of Torts from 1976, as 
well as an edition of Prosser’s Law of Torts that was available in 1978. Id. at 70–71, 76 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 537, 540, 545A cmt. B (AM. LAW INST. 1979); KEETON & PROSSER, 
supra note 59, at 794). 
 159. Id. at 77. 
 160. Compare Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) (No. 15-145) (requiring a formal misrepresentation by a 
debtor in order to constitute “actual fraud” under the statute), with Lawson v. Sauer Inc. (In 
re Lawson), 791 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 2015 WL 4537882 (U.S. 
July 24, 2015) (No. 15-113) (rejecting the misrepresentation requirement used by the Fifth 
Circuit), and McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2000) (using canons of 
construction and legislative history to rule that misrepresentation is not required under the 
statute). 
 161. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 120. 
 162. See Field, 516 U.S. at 70–71. 
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sources of interpretation from the time the statute was written (e.g., 
dictionaries, Restatements, and treatises), it is clear that “actual fraud” 
refers to the First Circuit’s ruling in Lawson, and concerns the transferor’s 
intent, not what he may or may not say as a misrepresentation.163 
One tool used to find the definition of a term is the Restatement—in this 
case, the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Because the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts was written in 1979, its definitions provide insight into § 523, 
which was codified in 1978.  One issue that has caused further confusion 
among the circuits is determining which section of the Restatement applies 
to “actual fraud.”  The First Circuit applied section 871,164 while the Fifth 
Circuit followed the Supreme Court in Field and applied section 537 to 
reach its decision.165  However, the Restatement shows that section 871 is 
applicable to the conduct that occurred in these cases and actual fraud in 
general, not section 537. 
Restatement section 871 is titled “Intentional Harm to a Property 
Interest” and states that “[o]ne who intentionally deprives another of his 
legally protected property interest or causes injury to the interest is subject 
to liability to the other if his conduct is generally culpable and not 
justifiable under the circumstances.”166  Furthermore, the comments state, 
“[T]he rule applies when title to land has been obtained by fraud or duress 
and has been transferred to one other than a bona fide purchaser.”167  
Additionally, the comments provide that “actual fraud” “applies when one 
has interfered with the possessory interests of another in land or chattels, 
either by causing harm to the subject matter or by depriving the other of 
possession.”168  The definition and the comments show that more important 
than a transferor’s misrepresentation (or lack thereof) is the transferor’s 
intent to defraud, as the term encompasses the transfer of property under 
general culpable or fraudulent behavior. 
On the other hand, section 537 was used by the Supreme Court in Field, 
as part of its analysis of the term “misrepresentation.”169  The Fifth Circuit 
also used this section in Ritz, as it believed that Field was controlling, and 
because Husky did not identify a more appropriate section to use.170  The 
section states the general rule for the level of reliance a recipient of a 
fraudulent misrepresentation must show in order to recover against the 
transferor.171  This is only relevant when assessing the level of reliance 
required when the debtor makes an affirmative misrepresentation under the 
“misrepresentation” prong of the statute.172  It does not serve a purpose 
when assessing behavior under the “actual fraud” provision, as “actual 
 
 163. Lawson, 791 F.3d at 222. 
 164. Id. at 219 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)). 
 165. Ritz, 787 F.3d at 318–19 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537). 
 166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871. 
 167. Id. § 871 cmt. a. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 70 (1995). 
 170. See Ritz, 787 F.3d at 318–19, 318 n.9. 
 171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537. 
 172. See Field, 516 U.S. at 70. 
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fraud” does not necessarily require a misrepresentation to rely on.  Using 
this section to analyze the meaning of “actual fraud” is severely 
constraining and does not fully represent what Congress intended to enact 
with § 523. 
Black’s Law Dictionary from 1979 adds to the belief that “actual fraud” 
encompasses more than just misrepresentation, by distinguishing it from the 
term “fraud” in general.  The dictionary defines fraud as “[a] false 
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct, by false 
or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have 
been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he 
shall act upon it to his legal injury.”173  Based on this definition, it is easy to 
see how a court can read “actual fraud” to require a misrepresentation.  
However, the dictionary goes on to specify the types of fraud and includes a 
separate category to distinguish “actual fraud” from “constructive fraud.”174  
“Actual fraud” is defined as an act involving 
deceit, artifice, trick, design, some direct and active operation of the mind; 
it includes cases of the intentional and successful employment of any 
cunning, deception, or artifice used to circumvent or cheat another.  It is 
something said, done, or omitted by a person with the design of 
perpetrating what he knows to be a cheat or deception.175 
The distinction supports the belief that “actual fraud” encompasses more 
than just a misrepresentation.  More important than whether a transferor 
makes a misrepresentation is the transferor’s intent to defraud or cheat.  The 
distinction between “fraud” and “actual fraud” is important, as Congress 
chose to codify “actual fraud” when given the opportunity to decide 
between the terms and explicitly stated so.176  Furthermore, Collier 
Bankruptcy Manual, the leading treatise on bankruptcy, lists Black’s 
definition for “actual fraud” as the correct definition of the term, and goes 
on to clarify that “actual fraud” (as opposed to fraud in general) concerns 
deception or deceit.177 
Slightly less applicable is Prosser’s Law of Torts, which allows a party to 
recover for the wrongful possession of chattel obtained by fraud, where the 
acquisition of the goods constitutes the wrongful act.178 
These sources show that there is a legal distinction between “general 
fraud” and “actual fraud.”  “Actual fraud” is a term that is meant to 
encompass one’s fraudulent intent to obtain property that is not that 
person’s, where fraud in general is meant to encompass an act involving 
misrepresentation.  By using the term “actual fraud” as opposed to just 
“fraud,” Congress meant to encompass more than just situations involving a 
 
 173. Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Actual or Constructive Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). 
 176. See 124 CONG. REC. H.11,089, at 32,399 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of 
Hon. Don Edwards) (“Subparagraph (A) is intended to codify current case law . . . which 
interprets ‘fraud’ to mean actual or positive fraud rather than fraud implied in law.”). 
 177. 4 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra note 68, ¶ 523.08[1][d]. 
 178. KEETON & PROSSER, supra note 59, at 794. 
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misrepresentation.  Reading § 523 to require a misrepresentation to 
constitute “actual fraud,” as the Fifth Circuit did, is contrary to the 
definition of the term and is severely limiting in determining behavior that 
should be excepted from discharge. 
Finally, it is possible to attribute meaning to a statute based on the other 
terms used in the statute.  The rule against surplusage is a canon of 
construction that says, in a single statute, each term must be read to have a 
unique meaning from the other terms.179  Otherwise, some terms would be 
considered superfluous or redundant and thus useless in contributing 
distinct meaning.180  Courts have analyzed the terms of § 523 this way and 
have attempted to attribute a distinct meaning to each term of the statute.181  
By looking at the definitions that courts have given to “false pretenses” and 
“false representations,” it is possible to construct a distinct definition of 
“actual fraud.”  The distinction that courts have created supports the finding 
that “actual fraud” is meant to encompass a different type of behavior than 
constructive fraud.  Specifically, it exists to penalize a debtor’s fraudulent 
intent.  Additionally, it is clear that the term is meant to encompass more 
than just the misrepresentation requirement of fraud in general. 
Courts’ analyses of the distinction between “false representation” and 
“false pretenses” are particularly helpful in this exercise.  In a case 
concerning a bankruptcy proceeding used to avoid payment of a judicial 
order, a New York court highlighted this distinction.182  The court held that 
“[a]s distinguished from false representation, which is an express 
misrepresentation[,] false pretense involves an implied misrepresentation or 
conduct intended to create and foster a false impression.”183  Reading the 
statute to require a misrepresentation to constitute both “false 
representation” and “actual fraud” would, in essence, codify the same thing 
twice, leaving one redundant or superfluous.  Additionally, attributing this 
meaning to “false pretenses” creates a unique definition from “actual fraud” 
by requiring false impression.  “Actual fraud” concerns the debtor’s intent 
and does not consider the creditor’s impression of the debtor.  Reading the 
terms this way attributes a distinct meaning to each that is consistent with 
what Congress codified. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that the terms of § 523 
“incorporate the general common law of torts.”184  As a result, appellate 
courts have analyzed the “false representation” prong of § 523 to require six 
common law elements185: 
 
 179. See Farber & McDonnel, supra note 34, at 630 (citing ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 
34, at 267). 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Palmacci v. Umpierrez, 121 F.3d 781, 786–87 (1st Cir. 1997); In re Hartley, 479 
B.R. 635, 642 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Scarlata, 127 B.R. 1004, 1009 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1991), aff’d, 979 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 182. See Hartley, 479 B.R. at 642. 
 183. Id. (quoting In re Weinstein, 31 B.R. 804, 809 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983)); see also 
Scarlata, 127 B.R. at 1009 (citing In re Guy, 101 B.R. 961, 978 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988)). 
 184. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 70 n.9 (1995). 
 185. See Palmacci, 121 F.3d at 786. 
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Under the traditional common law rule, a defendant will be liable if (1)  
he makes a false representation, (2)  he does so with fraudulent intent, i.e., 
with “scienter,” (3)  he intends to induce the plaintiff to rely on the 
misrepresentation, and (4)  the misrepresentation does induce reliance, (5)  
which is justifiable, and (6)  which causes damage (pecuniary loss).186 
These six elements help create a meaning for false representation under 
§ 523 distinct from “false pretenses” and “actual fraud” by requiring both a 
false representation and the creditor’s reliance.  As previously discussed, 
“actual fraud” does not include misrepresentation or reliance from a creditor 
in its required elements.  Reading “false pretenses” and “false 
representations” in this manner necessitates a reading of “actual fraud” that 
requires proof of the transferor’s intent and the transferee’s complicity in 
defrauding the creditor; this does not include the requirement of a 
misrepresentation. 
C.  Aligning § 523 with the Purpose of the Code 
When the Code was rewritten in 1978, its primary purpose was to create 
a system that “give[s] the debtor a less encumbered ‘fresh start’ after 
bankruptcy.”187  However, as previously discussed, there is no absolute 
right to discharge as demonstrated by the various exceptions written in the 
Code.188  These exceptions were written with the idea of fairness in mind 
and were meant to ensure that financial relief is only available to those who 
were unfortunate in their ventures and truly deserve aid from the Code in 
order to start anew.189  The exceptions exist to prevent dishonest debtors 
from avoiding their obligations by exploiting the Code for their personal 
benefit at the expense of their creditors.  This concept of fairness, which 
guides much of the Code, lends support to the assertion that § 523 is meant 
to encompass various forms of fraudulent behavior and is not meant to be 
limited to acts of misrepresentation to constitute “actual fraud.” 
Section 523 is no different from the general premise of fairness that 
exists throughout the Code.  It was written to recognize that discharge is 
unavailable to those who obtain a debt via immoral means.  “False 
pretenses,” “misrepresentation,” and “actual fraud” are all torts that involve 
illicitly acquiring something of value.  Reading the term “actual fraud” to 
allow debtors such as Ritz or Lawson to reap the benefits of the Code 
because they did not misrepresent their fraudulent behavior is contrary to 
the purpose of both the Code and § 523.  Limiting § 523’s “actual fraud” 
 
 186. Id. (citing 2 F. HARPER ET AL., LAW OF TORTS § 7.1, at 381 (2d ed. 1986); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)). 
 187. S. REP. NO. 95-1106, at 1 (1978); see also JACKSON, supra note 84, at 225 
(“[D]ischarge is viewed as granting the debtor a financial fresh start.”). 
 188. See supra Part II.B. 
 189. See S. REP. NO. 95-1106, at 1 (discussing how the Bankruptcy Act—in addition to 
aiding debtors—serves to find an equitable balance for creditors seeking to recover a return 
on their property and to recognize the interests of unsecured creditors who would otherwise 
have no priority in recovery). 
2942 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
provision to require a misrepresentation would create a loophole that could 
turn the Code into an “engine for fraud.”190 
D.  Modernizing the Statute:  Making § 523 Work 
in the Context of Credit Card Transactions 
As discussed earlier, bankruptcy laws originally were created to aid 
creditors in their collection and have only somewhat recently softened their 
harsh stance on debtors.191  While the Code certainly has evolved to 
recognize the right for unfortunate debtors to start anew, it also serves to 
balance their rights with the rights of a creditor to recover what is rightfully 
his.192  In fact, Congress contemplated discharge and fairness in the same 
breath, writing the exceptions to allow only those who were unfortunate in 
their ventures to reap the benefits of the Code.193 
This is evident in the context of credit card fraud under § 523.194  In 
credit card fraud cases, a purported purchaser does not misrepresent to the 
credit card company that he can pay for the items he charges, he just buys 
with the intent of not paying (or with the inability to pay).195  Allowing a 
person to discharge a debt incurred by buying on credit when he or she is 
incapable of repaying a credit card company, because the debtor did not 
affirmatively misrepresent that he or she cannot pay, highlights a logical 
inconsistency in the text that does not conform to the Code.196  Expanded to 
cases such as Ritz or Lawson, this logic would allow a fraudulent debtor to 
abscond from his obligations, leaving the rights of the creditor to go by the 
wayside.  Such a reading would open the door to other Ritzes and Lawsons 
to perpetrate the same runaround using the Code as their aid. 
E.  Finding the Correct Balance 
Between Creditors and Debtors 
As previously stated, the Code, in part, serves to balance rights between 
creditors and debtors to establish a fair system of debt collection law.197  
The Supreme Court has stated that it “will not read the Bankruptcy Code to 
erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress 
intended such a departure.”198  Reading § 523 in such a way that prevents 
the creditor from collecting his funds would erode the past practice of 
balancing the parties’ interests.  Additionally, it would grant a dishonest 
debtor the ability to escape liabilities that they knowingly take on, which 
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would serve as a rash departure from the Code’s purpose of providing only 
an honest and unfortunate debtor with relief.199 
Judge Posner summed up this issue in his analysis of McClellan v. 
Cantrell.200  He explained that 
[t]he two-step routine that McClellan alleges and that we must take as 
true—in which Debtor A transfers valuable property to B for nothing in 
order to keep it out of the hand of A’s creditor and B then sells the 
property and declares bankruptcy in an effort to shield herself from 
liability for having colluded with A to defeat the rights of A’s creditor—is 
as blatant an abuse of the Bankruptcy Code as we can imagine.  It turns 
bankruptcy into an engine for fraud.201 
Enforcement of the Code is integral to our society.  Some argue that, like 
the way the government regulates various vices, it should regulate the way 
that borrowing and financial obligations are enforced.202  The proper 
application of discharge serves as a balance between the rights of borrowers 
and creditors that influences the amount a creditor is willing to lend and 
dictates what a borrower should set aside if the business venture is not 
successful.203  Integral to this balance is determining which assets are 
available to creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding and which are not.204  
Furthermore, in determining which debts are dischargeable in bankruptcy, a 
court must weigh the benefits of the “fresh start” policy against the harm 
deterred by the denial of discharge while considering the purpose of 
bankruptcy law.205 
In cases like Ritz and Lawson, it is easy to see which way the scales lean.  
The harm of allowing debtors to circumvent the law and engage in fraud 
certainly outweighs that debtor’s right to a fresh start.  Any other reading of 
§ 523, or the Code in general, would disrupt the balance that exists between 
the borrower’s rights and the creditor’s rights that could ultimately lead to a 
decrease in funds available for lending, create a general apprehension to 
lend, or increase monitoring in lending.  It is possible that such a dramatic 
change in the balance of power could lead to significant economic 
repercussions for more than just the parties involved in a loan transaction. 
The text and legislative intent of § 523 both indicate that “actual fraud” 
under the statute requires proof of intent of the receiving party to deceive 
the creditor, not to require a formal misrepresentation.206  However, some 
may argue that the distinction might be irrelevant, as there are still ways for 
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a creditor to recover.207  These proponents would argue that § 727 of the 
Code gives creditors an alternative method of recovery.  The provision 
prevents fraudulent transfers and states that a discharge shall not be granted 
in a bankruptcy proceeding if “the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud a creditor . . . has transferred . . . or has permitted to be 
transferred . . . property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the 
filing of the petition.”208 
This would apply to situations where the creditor seeks to collect his 
funds and the original debtor transfers the debt to a third party and files 
bankruptcy within a year of that transfer.  But what happens if the transfer 
occurred more than one year before the bankruptcy petition?  Or, how does 
the creditor recover if the original debtor has no means to repay his debts 
while the transferee possesses the funds and walks away scot-free?  Or, 
what happens if the bankrupt files their petition for bankruptcy under a 
chapter other than Chapter 7?  This will give the debtor a loophole to avoid 
his obligations and leave a creditor in a precarious situation.  If § 523 is 
read to require a misrepresentation, this could leave the creditor out of luck 
in collecting on the debt and thus shift the balance of rights between 
creditors and debtors. 
CONCLUSION 
The Code exists to ensure that there is a proper balance between the 
rights of a creditor and the ability of a debtor to have a “less encumbered 
‘fresh start’ after bankruptcy.”209  This is one of the reasons why § 523 was 
enacted:  to ensure that debts obtained by “false pretenses,” “false 
representation,” or “actual fraud” are not able to reap the benefits of the 
Code.210  However, this statute has proved to be problematic among the 
appellate courts, as a disagreement occurred concerning the requirements of 
“actual fraud.”211 
By looking at the legislative history of the Code and prior case law, 
textual analysis, conformity to the purpose of the Code, application to 
modern transactions, and the balance that exists between creditor and debtor 
rights, this Note shows that § 523 does not require a misrepresentation to 
constitute “actual fraud.”212  A reading requiring a misrepresentation would 
permit an unworthy debtor to evade his obligations and reap the benefits of 
the Code, thus leaving an innocent lender without recourse and forced to 
pay for the debtor’s fraudulent actions.213 
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The Supreme Court should resolve this issue and the circuit split that 
accompanies it, as it has the opportunity to establish a uniform application 
of a troublesome statute.  It seems likely that the Court will rule in favor of 
the lenders in these cases and rule that “actual fraud” does not require a 
misrepresentation.  Hopefully, such a ruling will limit the fraudulent 
activity of the Ritzes and Lawsons of the world and provide a system of 
discharge that is fair for everyone. 
